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Abstract: 
 
Purpose 
– This paper aims to investigate the purpose, reach and effectiveness of the customer identification 
framework of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).  
 
Design/methodology/approach 
– The article draws on relevant research and documents of the FATF, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision and the Alliance for Financial Inclusion to determine whether compliance with 
the standards and practices of the FATF would prevent anonymous usage of financial services.  
 
Findings 
– The FATF’s identification principles, guidance and practices resulted in processes that are largely 
bureaucratic and do not ensure that identity fraud is effectively prevented. Strict identification 
requirements on the other hand may impact on financial inclusion, leaving the FATF with little 
leeway to raise its standards. There are potential solutions, but they are longer-term and partial in 
nature.  
 
Originality/value 
– Current identification and verification practices affect the lives of millions of people around the 
globe. The measures are being enforced to ensure that users are appropriately identified. This article 
informs the debate by highlighting the weaknesses of the current approach. 
 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) sets international standards to be met by countries, financial 
institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions to combat money laundering and 
terrorist financing. To this end, specific FATF Recommendations set customer identification 
requirements to prevent anonymous business relationships, especially anonymous bank accounts. 
These anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorist financing (CTF) standards are aimed at 
increasing transparency of financial services. Banks that comply with these standards may, however, 
not necessarily ensure identification of customers. The article considers the current principles and 
limits of the current regime and whether the approach can be improved. 
 
 The FATF Recommendations extend to a large number of financial and also non-financial 
institutions, but for the sake of simplicity, this paper is restricted to the duties of banks. The focus is 
furthermore limited to individual customers that interact in their own capacity with banks. Beneficial 
owners and corporate identification give rise to additional layers of complexity that lie beyond the 
scope of a single article. 
A brief overview of the current identification standards of the FATF is provided before the focus of 
this article shifts to the meaning of “identification” and “verification” within the FATF framework. 
 
FATF: customer due diligence and record-keeping 
The FATF’s Recommendation 10 (Financial Action Task Force, 2012), read with its Interpretative 
Note, sets out the requirements regarding customer identification and verification. It commences by 
stating that countries should prohibit financial institutions from keeping anonymous accounts or 
accounts in obviously fictitious names and proceeds to state that these institutions should be required 
to undertake customer due diligence (CDD) measures when:  
◦ establishing business relations; 
◦ carrying out occasional transactions: above the applicable designated threshold (USD/EUR 15,000), 
or that are wire transfers in the circumstances covered by the Interpretive Note to Recommendation 
16; 
◦ there is a suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing; or 
◦ the institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously obtained customer 
identification data. 
 
The following CDD measures must be taken:  
◦Identifying the customer and verifying that customer’s identity using reliable, independent source 
documents, data or information. 
◦Identifying the beneficial owner, and taking reasonable measures to verify the identity of the 
beneficial owner, such that the financial institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner 
is. For legal persons and arrangements, this should include financial institutions understanding the 
ownership and control structure of the customer. 
◦Understanding and, as appropriate, obtaining information on the purpose and intended nature of the 
business relationship. 
◦Conducting ongoing due diligence on the business relationship and scrutiny of transactions 
undertaken throughout the course of that relationship to ensure that the transactions being conducted 
are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of the customer, their business and risk profile, 
including, where necessary, the source of funds. 
 
It is important to note that compliance with the CDD standards of Recommendation 10 (excluding the 
ban on anonymous accounts) should be implemented on a risk-based approach. In terms of this 
approach, that now underpins compliance with the FATF standards, countries and institutions are 
required to assess their money laundering and terrorist financing risks and to adopt appropriate, 
proportional compliance responses. Where higher risk is identified, enhanced CDD measures must be 
adopted. In the case of lower risks, countries may allow their banks to adopt simplified measures. 
Where there is proven low risk, regulators may also consider exempting relevant institutions, products 
and services from AML/CTF obligations. 
 
Standard, enhanced and simplified CDD  
Enhanced and simplified CDD measures imply that there is a standard level of CDD that applies to 
customers, products or services that pose a medium or standard level of risk. The FATF does not 
stipulate what standard CDD measures should entail. In its guidance document on financial inclusion, 
the FATF commented as follows (Financial Action Task Force, 2013a, par. 67):  
 
The FATF Recommendations do not specify the exact customer information (referred to by 
certain countries as ‘identifiers’) that businesses subject to AML/CTF obligations should 
collect to carry out the identification process properly, for standard business relationships 
and for occasional transactions above USD/EUR 15,000. Domestic legislation varies, 
although common customer information tends to consist of name, date of birth, address 
and an identification number. Other types of information (such as the customer’s 
occupation, income, telephone and e-mail address, etc.) are generally more business and/or 
anti-fraud driven and do not constitute core CDD information that must be collected as 
part of standard CDD-although such information could appropriately be part of enhanced 
CDD for higher risk situations. 
 
In addition to collecting the standard as well as supplementary information about a customer, 
enhanced CDD may also involve stricter verification processes and closer monitoring of transactions. 
The precise measures to be taken will depend on the risks that must be mitigated. 
 
Where risks are lower, institutions may be allowed to adopt simplified CDD measures. These 
measures should be commensurate with the lower-risk factors and may relate to all or only to some of 
the CDD measures, depending on what is required to mitigate the relevant risks. Without limiting the 
nature of the simplified measures, the FATF listed the following examples (Financial Action Task 
Force, 2012, INR 10 par 21):  
◦ verifying the identity of the customer and the beneficial owner after the establishment of the 
business relationship (e.g. if account transactions rise above a defined monetary threshold); 
◦ reducing the frequency of customer identification updates; 
◦ reducing the degree of ongoing monitoring and scrutinizing of transactions, based on a reasonable 
monetary threshold; and 
◦ not collecting specific information or carrying out specific measures to understand the purpose and 
intended nature of the business relationship, but inferring the purpose and nature from the type of 
transactions or business relationship established. 
 
Simplified CDD measures are, however, not acceptable whenever there is a suspicion of money 
laundering or terrorist financing, or where specific higher-risk scenarios apply (Financial Action Task 
Force, 2012, INR 10 par 21). These scenarios include doing business with foreign politically exposed 
persons (PEPs), who should be subjected to enhanced CDD, as they are considered as posing higher 
risks per se (Financial Action Task Force, 2012, Rec 12). Wire transfers are also excluded from the 
ambit of general risk-based measures (Financial Action Task Force, 2012, Rec 16). Specific rules 
apply to wire transfers and in terms of those rules, some simplification may be allowed in relation to 
low-value cross-border wire transfers: Countries may adopt a de minimis threshold value for cross-
border transfers (no higher than USD/EUR 1,000) below which the identities of the parties do not 
need to be verified and limited information may be permitted to accompany such transfers (Financial 
Action Task Force, INR 16 par 5). 
 
Identification and verification 
The FATF Recommendations do not define “identify” or “identification” for CDD purposes. 
 
According to the Oxford Dictionary (Oxford Dictionaries, 2013), the verb “identify” carries the 
following two meanings:  
1. to establish or indicate who or what (someone or something) is; and 
 
2. to associate someone or something closely with someone or something. 
 
The noun “identification” means:  
◦ the action or process of identifying someone or something or the fact of being identified; 
◦ a person’s sense of identity with someone or something; or 
◦ the association or linking of one thing with another. 
 
The non-mathematical meaning of the noun “identity” means:  
◦ the fact of being who or what a person or thing is; or 
◦ a close similarity or affinity. 
 
While “identify” carries a range of meanings, it is submitted that in the FATF context, it means 
establishing a prospective or current customer’s unique identity. 
 
The FATF standards are not only concerned with the recording of identifying particulars but also with 
“verification”. Verification refers to the authentication of the identifying particulars (Financial Action 
Task Force, 2013a, par. 66). The bank is expected to refer to reliable, independent source documents, 
data or information to verify the customer’s identifying particulars. Identification and verification are 
inter-related but separate processes (Chatain et al., 2011, p. 77). Identification is completed when 
sufficient information is obtained to enable the institution to establish who the customer is. 
Verification processes, on the other hand, are undertaken to obtain assurance that some or all of the 
obtained information is actually correct and relates to that particular customer. 
 
While the FATF’s Recommendations advise institutions not to keep anonymous accounts or accounts 
in obviously fictitious names, they do not specifically clarify their concept of anonymity. In 
discussions with various FATF representatives and stakeholders, they generally used “anonymous” 
and “not correctly identified” synonymously. They tended to classify a customer as anonymous or as 
not identified for FATF purposes in cases such as the following:  
◦ where no customer particulars are collected to enable the bank to establish who the customer is; 
◦ where too little information is collected about a customer to enable the bank to establish who the 
customer is (this includes the case where comprehensive information is gathered and verified 
regarding another person, for instance a puppet who is clearly controlled by or acting for the benefit 
of the beneficiary, and no steps are taken to identify, verify and record the particulars of the 
beneficiary); 
◦ where reasonable steps are not taken to verify a person’s identifying particulars (this may overlap 
with the prohibition against opening an account in an obviously fictitious name where the customer’s 
actual identity is not recorded); 
◦ where information is collected and verified but not correctly recorded and retained to ensure that the 
bank retains its knowledge about the customer’s identity; and 
◦ where information is collected and verified but identifying particulars are not updated and refreshed 
with the result that the bank after some time is unable to state with confidence that it knows who the 
customer is. 
 
The FATF’s concept of identification appears focused on processes and documents rather than 
substance: A customer has not been correctly identified if the bank failed to collect prescribed 
identifying particulars of that customer or failed to verify the person’s identity. The fact that the 
banker personally knows the customer well is of little relevance if the prescribed details were not 
collected, verified and recorded in terms of the bank’s policies and the applicable statutory obligations 
of the bank. 
 
The purpose of identification and verification measures 
The FATF has not explicitly stated the purpose of identification and verification processes. It is 
generally deemed obvious that they are aimed at ensuring that banks know business and signification 
transactional customers. 
 
Does that mean that the measures are aimed at preventing identity fraud? FATF is certainly concerned 
about identity fraud and theft, especially relating to new payment methods (Financial Action Task 
Force, 2010, par 42; Financial Action Task Force, 2013b). FATF’s approach to customer 
identification, however, leaves a question mark as to whether the prevention of identity fraud is a 
distinct objective of these standards. Whether the AML/CTF identification and verification measures 
can effectively assist in preventing identity fraud depends largely on their stringency and integrity of 
the processes. The stringency in turn depends on factors such as the information collected on a 
customer and the quality of that information. The quality of the information gathered is closely linked 
to verification processes. FATF’s approach to these aspects and the weaknesses that the approach 
introduced will be explored in greater detail below. 
 
What information should generally be collected about a customer? 
Before the adoption of the 2003 standards and the “Customer Due Diligence” language, the term 
“Know Your Customer” (KYC) was often used. KYC and CDD are broader than mere identification 
and verification of identities and are closely linked to the concept of customer profiling. 
 
The FATF’s CDD principles refer to profiling of customers and the need to monitor the customer’s 
activity to ensure that the transactions being conducted are consistent with the bank’s knowledge of 
the customer, their business and risk profile, including, where necessary, the source of funds. The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) views profiling as central to CDD and customer 
risk mitigation. From the BCBS perspective, the identification and verification processes are therefore 
not merely aimed at recording the customer’s correct name but at obtaining sufficient information to 
draw an appropriate business and risk profile of the customer (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2001, pp. 3-4). Profiling enables the bank to assess and mitigate the risks posed by the 
customer. It also supports customer monitoring because it assists the bank to anticipate the customer’s 
normal transaction pattern. A transaction that deviates from that pattern may attract the attention of 
the bank’s customer monitoring program and may result in a report to the Financial Intelligence Unit. 
The reliability of profiling depends however on the sufficiency and accuracy of the customer 
information that is gathered. 
 
According to the BCBS, the following information should be obtained from a customer for purposes 
of standard CDD (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003, par. 10): 
 
For natural persons, the following information should be obtained, where applicable:  
◦ legal name and any other names used (such as maiden name); 
◦ correct permanent address (the full address should be obtained; a Post Office box number is not 
sufficient); 
◦ telephone number, fax number and e-mail address; 
◦ date and place of birth; 
◦ nationality; 
◦ occupation, public position held and/or name of employer; 
◦ an official personal identification number or other unique identifier contained in an unexpired 
official document (e.g. passport, identification card, residence permit, social security records, driving 
license) that bears a photograph of the customer; 
◦ type of account and nature of the banking relationship; and 
◦ signature. 
 
The bank should use that information to draw and assess a customer’s risk profile. Where customers 
are assessed as having a higher risk profile, additional inquiries must be made or information 
obtained, for example relating to the person’s address, source of wealth or prior banking relationships 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003). 
 
The BCBS guidance has shaped current banking practices and supervisory expectations. In 2012, the 
Alliance for Financial Inclusion surveyed the customer identification practices of a group of 
developing country members. The survey reflects the extent to which the extensive list of the BCBS 
impacted on identification practices relating to customers with a standard risk profile (Alliance for 
Financial Inclusion, 2013; Table I). 
 
While this overview of customer information requirements in the six countries reflects extensive 
collection of information by some, it is also noticeable that this pattern is not consistent. South Africa, 
a FATF member since 2004, for example, only requires the bare minimum to be collected. 
 
The BCBS guidance is currently being revised to reflect the 2012 revised Basel Core Principles for 
Effective Banking Supervision as well as the 2012 revised FATF Recommendations. The general 
thrust of the BCBS approach remains, although the list of identification particulars and verification 
options does not appear in their 2013 discussion document. The discussion document does however 
still emphasize profiling as an important first step in risk-rating customers (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2013). 
 
Differences between the FATF and BCBS views of profiling  
There is evidence of differences between the post-2012 BCBS and FATF views of profiling. The 
2013 FATF guidance on financial inclusion discusses the minimum particulars that banks should 
obtain from customers. According to the FATF, information such as the customer’s occupation, 
income and contact details does not constitute core CDD information that must be collected as part of 
standard CDD (Financial Action Task Force, 2013a, parr. 75 and 102). This is not the view held by 
the BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013, par 30). It is submitted that it is unlikely 
that a reliable customer profile for AML/CTF purposes can be drawn without information about a 
customer’s occupation and income (De Koker, 2011, pp. 376-377). 
 
FATF’s simplified CDD processes also fit uncomfortably with the BCBS profiling approach. In terms 
of the BCBS approach, sufficient information must be collected to draw an appropriate risk profile 
and, where the customer is assessed as posing a higher risk, additional steps should be taken. The 
FATF model allows for upfront, mainly product-based profiling and for very limited information to be 
gathered where the risks are assessed as lower. In this context, the FATF acknowledged that there is a 
risk that monitoring of transactional activity may fail in the context of simplified CDD. This would 
happen when too little information is gathered to profile a customer, thereby undermining the ability 
of monitoring mechanisms to identity suspicious and unusual activity (Financial Action Task Force, 
2013a, par 76). Although the FATF noted this possibility, it has not provided further guidance on how 
this result can be avoided. 
 
The general impression is therefore that the FATF, unlike the BCBS, does not regard profiling and the 
extensive collection of identifying particulars and contextual customer information as central to 
general CDD. It does recognize its value in relation to higher-risk customers, but its approach 
indicates that this view does not extend to lower-risk customers or even standard-risk customers. 
 
Where limited information is gathered about a customer, the ability of identification and verification 
measures to combat identity fraud depends very heavily on the identifying value of the information 
and on its verification. The limitations of the FATF approach in respect of verification will be 
discussed below. 
 
In conclusion it should be noted that FATF and the BCBS differences appear to extend beyond 
profiling to the level and stringency of CDD in general. While the FATF in 2012 adopted a risk-based 
approach that allows for simplified CDD in lower-risk cases, the BCBS in the same year adopted a 
strict approach to CDD when it issued its revised Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
in 2012 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2012). Core Principle 29 (Abuse of financial 
services) states that “the supervisor should determine that banks have adequate policies and processes, 
including strict customer due diligence (CDD) rules to promote high ethical and professional 
standards”. It is not clear that the concept of “strict” CDD rules as envisaged by the BSBS would 
include adopting simplified CDD in lower-risk cases. 
 
 
 
 
Stringency of the verification measures 
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A bank meets key AML/CTF obligations if it gathers prescribed identifying information about a 
prospective customer and ensures that prescribed steps are taken to verify the customer’s particulars. 
As pointed out above, the FATF requires the person’s identity to be verified “using reliable, 
independent source documents, data or information”. The FATF has not given specific guidance 
regarding to the source documents, data or information that it regards as reliable or regarding its test 
for reliability. This is a matter that it generally leaves to countries to determine (Financial Action Task 
Force, 2013a, par 77). In general however, the FATF endorsed processes that require information to 
be verified against formal government-issued documentation such as a national identity document, 
Medicare card, driver's license, etc. The assumption is that these documents offer reliable proof of 
information set out in it. 
 
The reliability of such state-issued documentation differs from country to country. Although 
reliability is vital to the efficacy of the verification processes, FATF has not addressed it 
comprehensively. While the FATF obviously prefers the use of reliable state-issued documentation, 
neither its pre-2013 mutual evaluation procedures nor those for the fourth round of mutual evaluations 
(Financial Action Task Force, 2013c) explicitly require assessors to investigate and comment on the 
reliability of state-issued documents of countries. The mutual evaluation reports produced in the third 
round of mutual evaluations do not provide a comprehensive or even consistent picture in this regard. 
In general, the evaluation methodology supports a box-ticking approach: If a country compels its 
institutions to verify identities using state-issued documents, it would generally be rated as technically 
compliant with the verification standard, even though the reliability of those documents may be 
questionable. Whether reliability will be considered in the fourth round of mutual evaluations as part 
of an assessment of effectiveness, will be in the hands of individual assessment teams. 
 
Financial Action Task Force’s 2009 mutual evaluation report provides a good example of the general 
FATF assessment approach in this regard. The report records that regulated institutions are required to 
identify and verify the identities of their customers using official South African identification 
documents (Financial Action Task Force, 2009, par 398). Yet, no remark was made about the serious 
concerns regarding the integrity of the official South African identity document and passport (SAPA, 
2005). For some years, there was growing national and international concern regarding the integrity of 
the documents. Corrupt officials of the South African Department of Home Affairs, the government 
department that issues passports and identity documents, have issued original documents in the names 
of choice to undocumented migrants, refugees and criminals. In February 2009, it was announced that 
the United Kingdom was imposing visa restrictions from March 2009 on the more than 400,000 South 
Africans who visit the UK each year, because genuine South African passports can be bought too 
easily from corrupt officials. Although the South African government has repeatedly acknowledged 
the problems and embarked pre-2009 on actions to improve the integrity of the national identification 
infrastructure, the 2009 FATF report was silent on the matter. 
 
Verification challenges are however not confined to countries with unreliable national identification 
systems. Even in countries where the documentation is reliable, very few institutions train their 
employees to identify forged documents. The verification processes may therefore fail to provide 
reasonable assurance. Most crucially, these failures are more likely in the case of criminals and 
terrorists who wish to hide or disguise their identities by obtaining high-quality false verification 
documentation. It is ironic that the failure of the verification procedure is therefore more likely to 
occur in the very cases that the system attempts to prevent. 
 
The limits of the FATF identification principles 
The FATF’s lack of clarity regarding the particulars required for identification purposes, its apparent 
rejection of the more extensive profiling requirements of the BCBS and its lack of consistent 
assessment and enforcement of usage of reliable verification documents, data and information, 
undermine the general identity fraud combating value of its identification and verification measures. 
 
The FATF’s risk-based approach and exemptions as well as the development of new payment 
methods may limit the value of these measures further. 
 
The risk-based approach to CDD  
To shift AML/CFT resources to higher-risk scenarios and to facilitate financial inclusion, FATF 
allows for the adoption of simplified CDD measures in relation to lower-risk customers, products and 
services. In practical terms, simplified measures may allow for less customer information to be 
gathered and less stringent verification of that information. In the financial inclusion space, money 
laundering and terrorist financing risk are often mitigated by a range of restrictions that ensure that the 
relevant products involve low-value amounts (Isern and de Koker, 2009). Although these restrictions 
may mitigate money laundering risk and arguably also terrorist financing risk, the simplified 
identification and verification measures are not necessarily effective to combat identity fraud in 
relation to those products. 
 
FATF exemptions  
The footprint of the FATF standards does not extend to all financial transactions. National laws, for 
example, may allow a bank to conclude a non-account-based transaction of USD 14,000 without 
asking for identification and verification of the customer. This is possible as occasional transactions 
involving less than USD/EUR 15,000 are not covered by the FATF scheme. Countries may 
furthermore adopt a de minimis threshold value for cross-border transfers (no higher than USD/EUR 
1,000) below which the identities of the parties do not need to be verified and limited information 
may be allowed to accompany such transfers (Financial Action Task Force, 2012, INR 16 par 5). 
 
The 2012 Recommendations also opened to the door to another intriguing possibility. They recognize 
that CDD can be simplified in lower-risk cases by, among others, “verifying the identity of the 
customer and the beneficial owner after the establishment of the business relationship (e.g. if account 
transactions rise above a defined monetary threshold)” (Financial Action Task Force, 2012, INR 10 
par 21). A customer holding an account where the balance or the value of the transactions does not 
rise above the defined threshold will therefore remain unverified. This outcome would run counter to 
the FATF’s general ban on anonymous accounts but is allowed as an exception. This exception is of 
course only allowed where the bank does not suspect the customer of money laundering or terrorist 
financing. 
 
Mexico has taken the concept of anonymity in low-risk financial services one step further. They 
implemented a tiered risk-based approach to bank accounts where the risk control measures increase 
in relation to the functionality of the accounts. The most basic account is not subject to any customer 
identification and verification requirements. The Mexican tiered approach is based on a mixture of 
low-risk exemptions from FATF controls and simplified CDD measures in relation to lower-risk 
products. 
 
The anonymous Mexican accounts are subject to various restrictions to limit risks of money 
laundering or terrorist financing abuse (Alliance for Financial Inclusion, 2013). Monthly deposits are, 
for example, restricted to 750.00 UDIS (around USD $250) with a non-cumulative balance limit of 
1,000 UDIS (around USD $350). Accounts may only be held by natural persons, cannot be linked to a 
mobile money account and must be opened in person. The accounts can furthermore only be used for 
domestic transactions and cannot be used to transfer amounts to other accounts or financial products. 
They may be used to receive remittance payments, but in that case, the names of the originator and the 
beneficiary must be recorded. The accounts are monitored and suspicious transactions must be 
reported to the Financial Intelligence Unit. 
 
The FATF Recommendations prohibit anonymous accounts and the Mexican model appears to be in 
breach of this prohibition. The FATF standards, however, also allow countries not to apply some of 
the Recommendations provided that there is a proven low risk of money laundering and terrorist 
financing, that this occurs in strictly limited and justified circumstances and that it relates to a 
particular type of financial institution or activity (Financial Action Task Force, 2012, INR 1 par 6). 
Mexico argues that the usage restrictions and controls imposed on these basic accounts bring these 
anonymous accounts within this exemption. Whether this approach meets the FATF standards will be 
assessed during the Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluations and the answer may depend heavily on the 
quality of the risk assessment that informed the Mexican model. If the FATF approves the scheme, a 
number of other countries are set to follow their example and create categories of anonymous, low-
risk accounts. 
 
New payment methods  
The FATF is very concerned about the money laundering and terrorist financing risks posed by new 
payment methods such as mobile money (Chatain et al., 2011), Internet banking, cyber currencies and 
prepaid cards (Financial Action Task Force, 2013b). New payment methods do pose risks of 
anonymous usage, depending on the design of the applicable regulations and the applicable business 
model. However, the FATF’s work on new payment methods does not sufficiently address the risks of 
anonymous usage that is linked to older technology such as automatic teller machines, debit cards and 
credit cards. These allow for services to be secured by one, identified person but used by other, 
unknown and unidentified parties. Similar potential lies in individual beneficial ownership structures 
and corporate structures, which fall outside the scope of this article. 
 
Some solutions 
The FATF finds itself in a bind. AML/CTF measures, especially CDD measures, are expensive 
(Sathye, 2008; Veris Consulting, 2013). They also exact a social cost, as the verification requirements 
may form barriers that prevent socially marginalized people from accessing financial services (De 
Koker, 2006; Bester et al., 2008). 
 
An obvious solution to the lack of effectiveness of the current measures is to require more robust 
identification and verification practices in respect of not only higher-risk services but also lower-risk 
services. That would however increase the costs of the current processes and undermine financial 
inclusion. Where AML/CTF measures undermine financial inclusion, overall ML/FT risk may 
increase, as significant numbers of persons will have to continue to use non-transparent, cash-based 
and informal financial services (Financial Action Task Force, 2013a, parr. 1-3). Such measures may 
therefore increase the integrity risks that the FATF attempts to mitigate. 
 
The current FATF measures are of course perversely also one of the factors driving identity fraud on 
banks: If banks did not have identification processes to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing, criminals would not have to resort to using false identities to open and operate accounts. 
Increasing identification requirements to combat identity fraud may therefore also generate additional 
identity fraud. 
 
Improve national identification systems  
A partial but longer-term solution lies in improving the reach and the integrity of national 
identification systems (Isern and de Koker, 2009). Nigeria and India are examples of countries that are 
in the process of providing national identity numbers and national identity cards to millions of citizens 
and residents (Dass, 2011; Gold, 2011; Gelb and Clark, 2013). Although the relevance of improved 
national identification infrastructure to AML/CFT was noted before 2012 (Bester et al., 2008), the 
FATF did not address this in its revised standards. Of course, even if full coverage is reached, it will 
not address the identification issues that currently plague countries with unreliable national 
identification systems. 
 
Identifiability  
The current FATF approach attempts to ensure that all customers are identified. Despite the costs of 
the measures and their negative impact as a barrier to financial services, these processes are not 
necessarily sufficiently robust to ensure that customers are actually identified. 
 
New payment methods, especially mobile money, provide the ability to identify and locate an 
unidentified user. This potential developed since the FATF standards took form in the late 1980s. 
Mobile phone usage reveals much about the behavioral patterns, personal preferences and social 
networks of customers. The data are even richer where the customer also uses the mobile phone for 
financial transactions. When combined and mined with sophisticated data-mining tools, unidentified 
users may be identified (De Montjoye et al., 2013). 
 
Such data collection and mining by financial and the telecommunications service providers present 
significant risks of abuse not only by the private sector and criminals but also by authorities (Paik, 
2010; Jentzsch, 2012; Harris et al., 2013; De Koker and Jentzsch, 2013). There are therefore sound 
reasons to ensure that appropriate legal and other controls apply. In the context of AML/CTF 
however, this capability may provide an alternative to the current large-scale identification approach. 
It enables the identification of the few when required by law enforcement, rather than the 
comprehensive but unsuccessful attempt to identify all users, just in case law enforcement may be 
interested in some. 
 
Profiling  
Profiling in the AML/CFT space, as discussed earlier, means the collection of sufficient data about the 
customer to enable a bank to assess the risks posed by that customer and to anticipate the general 
pattern of conduct of the customer. It is possible to use profiling to manage money laundering and 
terrorist financing risks even when verification does not occur. Profiling is, for example, gaining 
traction in the credit scoring space where Big Data analytics are used to determine the likelihood of 
repayment of a small loan by a person who does not have a credit record (Kumar and Muhota, 2012; 
Lobosco, 2013). In the AML/CTF context, it may allow for a model where a customer for a lower-risk 
product is identified and has to provide profiling information, but where verification is not undertaken 
upfront. Where such customers’ usage of the product diverges from the expected pattern, they may be 
refused further services or may have their transactions suspended until they enable the bank to verify 
their identifying particulars. Identification and profiling can therefore provide increased risk 
mitigation benefits in relation to lower-risk products, without posing the financial inclusion barriers 
that are inherent in many verification practices (Isern and de Koker, 2009). 
 
Conclusion 
The FATF’s identification and verification framework was developed to ensure that banks know who 
their customers are. There is however little evidence that the current FATF approach is designed to 
achieve that purpose effectively. The FATF has been vague on identification practices and appear to 
disagree with the BCBS’s approach regarding profiling. Neither has it instructed its assessors to 
consistently consider and assess the adequacy of the verification measures that are undertaken. While 
enhanced due diligence measures generally offer a higher level of comfort and certainty, the measures 
in relation to standard-risk and lower-risk customers are not necessarily sufficiently robust to prevent 
identity fraud. As a result, the current AML/CTF identification and verification processes are often 
expensive box-ticking exercises that inconvenience the honest but do not effectively bar the dishonest 
from using false identities to access financial services. 
 
This approach is not set to change under the new, mandatory risk-based approach of the FATF. Under 
this approach, regulators and banks will have more leeway to determine appropriate identification and 
verification measures for customers with different risk profiles. Identification and verification 
measures are set to be relaxed in relation to products and services that are assessed as posing a lower 
money laundering and terrorist financing risk. This is vital to support financial inclusion initiatives. It 
will not however improve certainty about the true identity of the users of those products. 
 
In the longer term, answers lie in improving national identification systems and in embracing 
identifiability in relation to appropriate new payment methods, such as mobile money. The starting 
point of the journey towards an improved system lies however in recognizing the weaknesses of the 
current approach. 
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